The United Kingdom has opted to leave the European Union. The trade and welfare consequences of this decision are large; most studies predict a trade and welfare loss for both the UK and the EU. The UK parliament has indicated that it aims for new and ambitious trade agreements following Brexit, but has not been explicit what type of trade agreements it envisions (except that it should be broad) or with whom specifically. In this paper, we consider the UK's options. We first confirm, in line with existing studies, that the negative trade consequences of Brexit are substantial, especially for the UK and also for the EU. After reviewing all potential options, we have a simple answer to the question whether the UK has an alternative for the existing trade agreement with the EU. The answer is: No. Only a trade agreement with the EU can compensate for the negative trade consequences of Brexit. JEL-Codes: F130, F140.
Introduction
On June 23, 2016, the people of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union (EU), the so-called Brexit. In a letter dated March 29, 2017, British prime minister informed the EU of the intention to terminate its EU membership.
The EU swiftly responded on March 31 that this '...creates significant uncertainties that have the potential to cause disruption, in particular in the UK but also in other member states (p.2).' 1 Indeed, the Brexit creates uncertainties on many fronts: political, social, and economic. In this paper, we will focus on the economic aspects of the Brexit and highlight the consequences of the Brexit on trade flows, and analyse the trade options of the UK.
From an international trade perspective, the choice of the UK to leave the EU is remarkable. Leaving a large free trade area as the EU is most likely trade and welfare reducing. Without a new agreement, relative trade barriers will change by making trade with the EU relatively more expensive compared to outside-EU trade, resulting in trade creation with the non-EU world and trade diversion away from the EU. The balance between these developments is most likely trade and welfare reducing, as trade barriers between the UK and the largest trading block in the world increase. This sombre evaluation is corroborated by almost all analyses of Brexit. The estimates range between roughly 1.5% reduction in GDP to more than 7%, depending on assumptions made how the Brexit takes place (Baldwin, 2016) .
Only 'Economists for Brexit' produced a positive estimate, but this seems to be an outlier in the available estimates (see Miles, 2016, p. 31 , for an overview).
The challenge for the UK is to find a new position within the world of trade agreements.
The letter of the UK prime minister (see note 1) indicates that the principles of the Brexit with respect to international trade are outlined in the White Paper of February 2, 2017, which says that the UK aims to (p.8) 'forge a new strategic partnership with the EU, including a wide reaching, bold and ambitious free trade agreement...' and that 'we will forge ambitious free trade relationships across the world '. 3 The various comments of politicians indicate that 1 See for the letter of the British prime minister: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/29_03_17_ article50.pdf. The answer from the EU: EU Draft Guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification under Article 50 TEU, Council of The European Union, XT 21001/17, Brussels. 2 The so-called Kemp-Wan theorem gives the condition for the net effect to be positive: trade must remain fixed after the change in membership. So, trade barriers have to adjust in special ways to make this happen (see Feenstra, 2016 , for a discussion).
the negotiations will at times become confrontational; the UK links the trade negotiations to security issues and Gibraltar, whereas Donald Tusk (EU president) has warned that 'cherry picking' by the UK will not be accepted by the EU (see note 1).
In this paper, we will not predict or speculate what the most likely outcome of Brexit negotiations will be, but instead analyse the options for the UK with respect to international trade. The UK indicated in the White Paper that it would like to 'forge new trade agreements.' The question we answer in this paper is what trade agreements could be an alternative to the current situation of UK's EU membership. Based on a state-of-the art gravity model we will first estimate with our data -value added trade data -what the consequences are of Brexit. Next, we will analyse options for the UK that have been put forward in several policy discussions -including a trade partnership with the US, or with various other parts of the world -and confront those estimates with a (renewed) partnership with the EU. Our broad conclusion is simple: the UK has no alternative than a trade agreement with the EU unless it is willing to accept a trade reduction.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology and our dataset.
Section 3 presents our estimation results. Finally, section 4 concludes.
Methodology

Gravity equation with counterfactual scenarios
A well-known and well-established method to estimate the consequences of trade agreements (TAs) is the so-called gravity equation (for a survey, see Head and Mayer 2014) . This is an accepted method to evaluate the effects of changes in variables that in some way affect barriers to trade between countries. Key in modern formulations of the gravity models are the so-called Multilateral Resistance (MLR) terms. These terms are related to price indices, and are important to analyse the effects of a TA between, say, two countries on the rest of the trading system. Without these terms, the simulated effects of a TA would only affect the two countries involved. With these price index terms present, however, a TA changes the MLR terms and thus affect the whole trading system as trade between any pair of countries takes place against the background of changed price indices. We provide a simple derivation to illustrate how this works.
We follow Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) , as summarized in Van Bergeijk and Brakman (2010, p. 9-10) and proceed in 6 steps.
Step 1: The first step is an equilibrium equation which says that the value of trade flows from country i to j, , should equal the share, , that country i has in expenditure of j, :
, where is the import price from i to j.
Step 2: Assuming the familiar constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand structure, it is straightforward to derive demand for each individual product and calculate , explicitly:
, where
where is the exact price index associated with the CES demand structure; σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties 'n i '; N is the number of countries.
Step 3: Trade costs are crucial in gravity models. Let 1 indicate all bilateral trade costs from country i to j (man-made and natural costs), then the price in market j equals:
, where is the so-called mill price of a product in the market of origin, i.
Step 4: The gravity model describes total bilateral trade, T ij , for industries, or countries, so we have to aggregate across varieties (products): , where we use , and the price including transportation costs.
Step 5: We assume that all goods are traded, implying that the total output of a country j, Y j , equals total sales to all destination countries (including the home country):
∑ ∑ , where we use the result of step 4. We can re-write this equation as follows:
, and substitute this in the final step of 4 to obtain:
Step 6: A gravity model [by combining step 4 and step 5]:
Equation (1) is a basic formulation of a modern gravity equation.
In empirical research, other variables are included that affect trade barriers, such as a common language between i and j, a shared border, similar history (colonies), and most importantly for this paper, being part of a common TA. Note that bilateral trade is not only affected by variables describing the bilateral relation between i and j, but also by П and , the MLR terms. These terms depend on all prices in the system. Changes in trade costs between two countries thus also affect the rest of the trading system. As a result, we have in our simulations two types of effects: those that directly affect the trading partners themselves because they exit/enter a TA, and the effects with respect to the rest of the world through the MLR terms (price index effects).
In practice, the estimation of equation (1) is difficult as the MLR terms depend on parameters that have to be estimated. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) have a custom programmed iteration model to find the estimates of equation (1). We follow Anderson et al. (2015) , as they have developed a more straightforward estimation method (see also Anderson and Yotov 2015; Larch and Yotov 2016) . A crucial step in their method is to re-estimate the model as described in steps 1-6, for the alternative policy scenario, the counterfactual model.
First, equation (1) In this paper, we will focus on the so-called 'full endowment general equilibrium' trade effects, i.e. the change in trade once income and expenditure have adjusted to the new MLR terms and counterfactual trade costs (for a detailed discussion, see Larch and Yotov 2015) .
Data
While traditional estimates of the gravity equation rely on gross trade data, a growing literature has emphasized the importance of using novel measures of value-added exports (VAX) data to account for the international fragmentation of production (see, e.g., Johnson
and Noguera 2012, Koopman et al. 2014, and Kaplan et al. 2016 ). In line with this development, we explicitly use data on trade in value-added instead of gross exports. Valueadded data are more relevant for exercises like we present in this paper because changes in value added trade are more directly linked to income and welfare of the countries involved.
Value-added exports are from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), covering 43 countries in 2014, the most recent year available.
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For a detailed description of WIOD, its construction and applications, see Timmer et al. (2015 Timmer et al. ( , 2016 . The 43 countries covered account for more than 85% of world GDP and are listed in Appendix Table A1 . Other typical gravity-equation controls (bilateral distance, contiguity and common language) are from CEPII (Mayer & Zignano 2011) . Trade agreement data are from Kohl (2014) and updated using the WTO Regional (Preferential) Trade Agreements Database.
Empirical strategy
Following Anderson et al. (2015) , we estimate the following equation with PPML:
where VAX is the value added exports of origin i to destination j at destination prices; DIST is the bilateral distance between the trade partners in kilometres; CNTG is a dummy which is 1 when i and j share a common border and 0 otherwise; BRDR is a binary variable equal to 1 if international trade is involved and 0 if the country is trading with itself (see step 5 in section 2.1); TA is 1 when i and j have a trade agreement and 0 otherwise; F i and F j represent origin and destination fixed effects, respectively, and are the MLR terms.
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5 Our results are qualitatively similar when using alternative data sources, specifically, (i) gross trade and production data generously provided by Mario Larch as used in Anderson et al. (2015) and Anderson and Yotov (2016) , and (ii) the OECD Trade in Value Added Database (TiVA). All results are available from the authors upon request. 6 Output and expenditure (origin and destination GDP in traditional gravity equations; see equation 1) are fully captured by the MLR terms in the baseline scenario, and recalculated based on the counterfactual trade costs (see Anderson et al. 2015) . 7 The baseline parameter estimates (robust standard errors) are -0.601 (0.047) for ln(DIST), 0.518 (0.137) for CNTG, -3.920 (0.148) for BRDR and 0.258 (0.084) for RTA; all estimates are significant at the 1% level.
In the following section, we will present the results of a series of different scenarios that can be calculated with the methodology outlined above.
First, we consider the case of a "hard Brexit", in which the UK terminates its EU membership and all trade agreements to which the UK belonged as member of the EU.
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In order to calculate the counterfactual trade costs, the binary TA variable will be "switched off", i.e. from 1 to 0, for all country-pairs involving the UK and another EU member. An alternative option might be a so-called "soft Brexit", in which the UK leaves the EU and retains its membership in all the EU's trade agreements with countries such as Canada, Mexico and South Korea.
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Second, once a "hard Brexit" is in place, we explore which trade agreements the UK can pursue in its "Global Britain" strategy. One possible option is that May and Trump negotiate a US-UK trade agreement. We will show that such an agreement would only have a minor role in reducing the UK's losses. To add insult to injury, even the most extreme case of a "Global Britain" in which the UK has a TA with all non-EU countries would still not be sufficient to offset the UK's post-Brexit loss in trade.
Finally, one may ask how severe the trade impact of Brexit would be in light of other potential threats to the international trade regime. We will consider the case of the US abandoning the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the dissolution of the EU, and, as a worst-case scenario, the collapse of all trade agreements worldwide.
Results
A full overview of all results is presented in Appendix Table A2 (percentage change compared to baseline, i.e. pre-Brexit) and Appendix Table A3 (change in absolute values).
Great Brexit
The set up for our discussion of the various scenarios is relatively straightforward. Ranked not very surprisingly, the exports and thereby the UK economy are hit much harder than the other EU member states or non-EU countries. These countries also experience a trade decline, but to a lesser extent than for the UK, because the UK market is smaller than that of the EU. The impact is also stronger if one focuses on VAX, as we do here, when compared with the impact of on gross trade as can be seen by comparing Figure 1 with the results for gross trade in Figure A1 in the Appendix. The main reason for this difference (which holds for all our scenarios) is that the value-added data take the intricate production value chain linkages between, in casu the UK and the rest of the world, into account whereas the gross trade data do not do so. 
"Global
Britain" where the UK by inter alia establishing new trade agreements arguably would be able to off-set the effects of Brexit for the UK economy. It is to this scenario that we turn to next.
Brexit with Global Britain
In this sub-section, we assume that a hard Brexit has materialized and then look into the effects of alternative trade agreements by the UK on the value-added exports for the UK and the other countries in our sample. Inspired Donald Trump's vocal support for Brexit and early talks by Trump with May after he became president of the USA, Figure 4 shows the effects of a bilateral trade agreement between the UK and the USA. Since we assume that this trade agreement is struck with the full Brexit in place, one should compare the outcomes in Figure   4 with those reported in Figure 1 . The main effect of the trade agreement between the UK and the USA is that it increases the value-added export for both countries by approximately 2%. For the UK, this implies that the negative impact of Brexit is only marginally offset by such a bilateral trade agreement with the USA (compare the -18% in Figure 1 with the -16%
in Figure 4 ). Easier access to the US market compensates the trade loss of Brexit to some extent, but within the logic of the gravity market the US is further away and thereby less attractive. In terms of our analysis, where as we stated before factor mobility is not taken into account, the no doubt long and difficult negotiations that would result in a Norway-type of deal between the UK and the EU would for the UK at best replicate the current trade agreement it has with the EU as an EU member! Brexit would then lead to new situation where the UK's trade agreement with the EU would essentially copy the current situation where the UK is an EU member.
3.3.
In Table A2 wed by a dis This paper reviews the alternatives that the UK government has. The central question we try to answer is: does the UK have an alternative compared to the current membership of the EU, that is, an alternative that would compensate for the large negative trade shock of Brexit. Reviewing the options that have emerged in discussions on Brexit, such as a broad agreement with the US, China, or all countries except the EU, our conclusion is simple: the UK has no trade-enhancing alternative than an agreement that mimics the current situation. 
